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Our 22 April post on the Verfassungblog about Viktor Orbán’s state of emergency
generated a thoughtful reply from Dr. Dániel Karsai, a well-respected Hungarian
lawyer.   We appreciate the chance to respond to his criticisms, alleging that we
made some factual errors about the operation of Hungarian law. 
One of these mistakes is that, as he correctly notes, the law prohibiting retroactive
adjustments to gender in birth records for transsexuals is pending before the
Parliament but hasn’t been enacted yet.  As Dr. Karsai also notes, however, the
Parliament will most probably pass it soon.   Our mistake is therefore temporary as it
will soon be fixed by an act of the Hungarian Parliament.
The other mistakes that Dr. Karsai alleges are more serious, as they go to the heart
of our argument that the constitutional framework that the government asserts
constrain Orbán’s use of emergency powers has been functionally disabled.  First,
he alleges that we underestimate the power of the Parliament to control Orbán
because the Parliament can reverse an emergency decree with a simple majority. 
  Then, he asserts that the ordinary courts are up and running in a way that will
surely generate challenges to Orbán’s decrees up to the Constitutional Court.  He
also claims we have made too much of the fact that the military has been deployed
to hospitals and strategic companies.  We believe that he is wrong about each of
these criticisms globally, even if he has found some small mistakes in the way we
explained the law specifically in our earlier post.   In fact, our conclusions have not
changed.  Orbán has no meaningful constraints on his power and the Hungarian
Enabling Act has created a dictatorship.    
On Cardinal Laws and Supermajorities
We argued in our initial post that the Parliament would have to vote by two-thirds
to remove the extraordinary power it just gave Orbán a month ago to override
laws indefinitely.   Dr. Karsai pointed out that Section 3 of the Enabling Act is not
“cardinal” which means that it does not require two-thirds of the Parliament to amend
it.   We did rely on Section 3 of the Enabling Act in our initial piece, and Dr. Karsai
is right that Section 3 is not cardinal, but we should have made more explicit in our
analysis the role of Section 2 of the Enabling Act, which is a cardinal provision.   Let
us explain to those less well versed in Hungarian law than Dr. Karsai why our initial
argument – that Orbán’s powers can only be removed if two-thirds of the Parliament
votes against him stands – because one must read Sections 2 and 3 of the Enabling
Act together.  
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In Hungarian constitutional law, laws passed by Parliament come in two flavors:
  cardinal and ordinary.  Cardinal laws, which provide more detailed regulation
elaborating the meaning of constitutional provisions and which therefore are
provided for in the constitution itself, can only be enacted or changed by a relative
two-thirds majority (that is, a majority of the MPs present).   Ordinary laws may be
enacted or changed by a simple majority.  We asserted in our original post that the
Parliament could only reverse Orbán’s decrees using the cardinal procedure; Dr.
Karsai claims that we are wrong and that a simple majority will do.  
Of course, Dr. Karsai agrees with us that Orbán presently controls two-thirds of the
seats in Parliament and this Parliament is unlikely in practice to overturn any decree,
even if the threshold were the lower one needed to change an ordinary law.    So,
for political reasons, Orbán’s decrees are here to stay even if he loses a substantial
amount of his support in Parliament.  We all agree both on this practical fact and on
the judgment that this poses a grave danger to the rule of law in Hungary.  
But we want to defend our reading of the Enabling Act in which we believe that it
would take a cardinal majority and not just an ordinary one to reverse one of Orbán’s
decrees.   Dr. Karsai is right to say that Section 3 of the Enabling Act, which reserves
to Parliament the ability to cancel Orbán’s indefinite extension of his emergency
decrees, is not by itself a cardinal provision.  So the Parliament may refuse to extend
the legal force of a specific decree of Orbán’s with a simple majority.   
Reversing the substance of a decree, however, is not as simple as that, and to show
why, we need to get into the weeds of the Enabling Law by exploring the intersection
of Section 2 and Section 3.   Section 2 is a cardinal part of the Enabling Act (as
defined in Section 9 of the Act), and that’s the part that gives Orbán the power to
“suspend the enforcement of certain laws, depart from statutory regulations and
implement additional extraordinary measures by decree.”  Parliament can only roll
back that power with a two-thirds vote.  Section 3 gives Parliament the power to
“withdraw [from the government] the authorization [to extend the effect of decrees]
before the end of the emergency.”   But note that Section 3 – the non-cardinal part
of the law – only allows the Parliament to reverse its grant of power to Orbán in
allowing the decrees to maintain their legal force indefinitely.  It does not affect the
grant of power, given in the cardinal part of the law in Section 2, to issue those
decrees in the first place.
If the Parliament were to withdraw its approval for an indefinite extension of a
particular decree with a simple majority under Section 3, Orbán could simply reissue
the very same decree again, using his powers in Section 2 of the Enabling Act. 
The grant of power in Section 2 allows Orbán to override any law by decree – and
therefore he could also override a simple-majority law that the Parliament would
pass to refuse an extension of the initial decree!   In our view, the continued effect
of Orbán’s emergency decrees rests on both Section 2 and Section 3, which is why
Parliament cannot eliminate the effects Orbán’s decrees with a simple majority. 
Parliament needs a two-thirds majority to properly control Orbán’s new powers given
to him in Section 2 of the law.
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To show how this works, let’s take one of Orbán’s decrees – for example, the one
we mentioned that gives the Minister for Innovation the power to gain access to the
personal data of any Hungarian, which is a direct violation of the EU General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) and its direct effect in Hungary.    Let’s assume that
the Parliament decides that allowing the government unlimited access to anyone’s
personal data is too dangerous a power for the government to have.  For example,
the Parliament might suddenly realize that there is no bar (as there isn’t in the
decree) on the one minister authorized to receive such private data passing it on
to the whole Cabinet or to anyone else for that matter.   And suppose that a newly
concerned Parliament votes by simple majority to refuse to extend this decree longer
than the 15 days that are set as a limit in the Fundamental Law in Article 53.3 . 
Section 3 of the Enabling Act allows Parliament to refuse to renew this decree after
15 days.   That’s what Dr. Karsai has argued, and he’s right as far as he goes.   That
particular decree would then cease to have legal force.   
But by refusing to extend a decree of Orbán’s (even assuming that Parliament would
do it), the Parliament has not stopped Orbán from giving unlimited personal data
access to the Innovation Minister.   If Orbán wants to continue this arrangement, all
he has to do is to reissue the decree again as soon as the Parliament cuts off the
effect of the earlier decree.  In fact, Orbán can keep doing that as long as he likes.
  The power to issue the decree in the first place, and to override any provision of
Hungarian (or European) law in doing so, rests on Section 2 of the Enabling Act,
which is a cardinal provision of the law requiring a two-thirds vote of the Parliament
to change.   All Parliament can do by using its power under Section 3 of the Enabling
Act is to make it slightly more complicated for Orbán because he would have to keep
reissuing the same decree anew every 15 days.   But Parliament cannot overturn the
substance of the decree itself with a simple majority; it can only refuse to extend this
particular decree’s effects while Orbán can simply issue a new decree with the very
same content.   And given the powers Parliament conferred on Orbán in Section 2,
Orbán can also override any attempt by the Parliament to control him under Section
3.  One can of course argue that a democratic head of government respecting the
rule of law would not reissue a decree after its continued effect has been cut off by
the Parliament. But the Hungarian government has shown in the last decade that
there is nothing that deters them if they need to do something to keep their power. 
In our original blogpost, we didn’t get into this level of detail about the precise way
that the Enabling Law works.   We did assert that Section 3 was cardinal when it is
not – and should have instead pointed to Section 2, which is cardinal, in grounding
Orbán’s power to issue decrees in the first place, rather than in Section 3, which
simply allows Orbán to extend the effects of the decree beyond 15 days. Dr. Karsai
was right to call us out on that.  But we submit that the bottom line of our analysis
remains the same – and in fact once we focus on the broad grant of power given in
the cardinal section of the law – in Section 2 – Orbán’s powers become even more
alarming because he can also simply override any action taken by the Parliament
under Section 3.    Parliament cannot stop Orbán with a simple majority, but only by
a two-thirds majority.
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On the Operation of the Hungarian Courts
Dr. Karsai, after pointing out correctly that the Hungarian courts were in fact closed
for the first two weeks of the emergency, greeted Decree 74/2020 with some
enthusiasm.  This decree ended the extraordinary suspension of judicial proceedings
introduced after 15 March by introducing a number of measures that allow for remote
hearings, introduction of electronic evidence and changed deadlines that allow the
courts to keep working as the emergency goes on.  The courts are now more or less
operating as usual, as Dr. Karsai says.   We all agree that this is surely better than
the sudden closure of courts that occured at the start.  
After consulting with a number of our colleagues who are practicing law in the
Hungarian courts, we learned that they, like Dr. Karsai, don’t see the problems with
the decree that we did.   They attest to the fact that the decree only modifies forms
of evidence and deadlines for different phases of the proceedings, and does not
change the usual procedures fundamentally.  One procedural change that is new
with the emergency is the procedural limitation to the ordinary operation of courts
in Decree 105/2020 on the reduced working time during emergencies, which does
not provide any possibility of appeal.  In addition, the decree eliminate the role of
lay judges in first-instance proceedings, so that a single professional judge will act
alone during the emergency. This can be problematic, especially in employment
law matters.   Our worries about the decree stem more from the fact that it is hard
to trust both the public prosecutor and many judges after a decade of assaults on
the independence of both so we immediately see potential for abuse in any grant of
discretion to them.  These problems existed before the emergency and one might
say truthfully that the emergency did not make things markedly worse. 
But here, too, our global point is unchanged.   The Hungarian government has
been saying that, because the Constitutional Court remains open, Orbán’s power is
controlled in a normal constitutional way.   But the Constitutional Court has adopted
a very cramped view of its jurisdiction in constitutional complaints.  Under the rules
since 2012, individuals have to show that they have been concretely harmed by
a legal norm, and they have to start in the ordinary courts, only appealing to the
Constitutional Court when they have not had their rights vindicated in the lower
courts.   But individuals rarely win at the Constitutional Court.
According to the Act on the Constitutional Court, a successful challenge to the
constitutionality of a legal norm requires a ‘direct involvement’ of the complainant
claiming the violation of his/her rights by one of the decrees.   As common
knowledge tells us, and as Dr. Karsai often litigating before the Constitutional Court
must have experienced, the Court has always been very restrictive in interpreting
whether or not a complainant has demonstrated direct involvement, and it is very
unlikely that it will make exceptions now, because as Karsai himself admits „in
politically sensitive cases they never interfered with the government.”  He’s not alone
in thinking this.   As a number of scholarly studies have shown, the Constitutional
Court in Hungary has become a reliable rubber-stamp for the government ever since
it was captured in 2013.   
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There is No Junta – but There is Abuse of Rights
Dr. Karsai dismisses as a “media show” the fact that military commanders have been
installed in each hospital and that small detachments of soldiers have been deployed
to 150 strategic companies. But the bottom line regarding the role of the army is also
that neither the Fundamental Law or the law on the management of natural disasters
gives power to the government to make extraordinary rules concerning the army. 
  Not living in Hungary, we cannot attest first-hand to the visibility of the military on
the streets, but we know that the military can play an important and undesirable role
even when it stays barracks, as it was the case with the Soviet army between 1956
and 1991.
The few remaining independent journalists in Hungary are starting to dig into just
what it means for the military to be installed throughout the hospitals and economy,
and the answer is alarming.   A detailed report in Index.hu by Gergely Brückner, one
of the most highly respected economic journalists in Hungary, found that the soldiers
were in fact quite active in the “strategic companies” to which they have been
posted.  While on balance the civilian management of these companies claimed to
appreciate the way that the soldiers have enabled rapid communication with the
government by unblocking supply chains, guaranteeing financing and organizing
logistics, the civilian managers also noted with alarm that the soldiers seemed most
interested in gathering the personal data of both employees and clients, as well
as the intellectual property of the companies. It is notable that all of the civilian
managers, despite saying that things were fine (except for the drip of data out the
door), spoke anonymously.   They clearly do not feel free to go on the record about
just what the military are doing inside their companies.  
In fact, the Orbán government has not only been unconstitutionally gathering a lot of
personal data during the emergency (through the decree that gives the Innovation
Minister the ability to access all private data without limit and through the exfiltration
of data out of the strategic companies by the military), but it has also been hoarding
information of general relevance that transparent and democratic governments
should release.   As Dr. Karsai himself admits, the government does not provide
public access to the relevant information regarding COVID-19 cases.   Among other
things, because briefings with the Emergency Task Force are not held in person,
journalists must send in questions ahead of time and the government answers only
selectively.    Many important questions are never answered.  
Journalist are not only denied these data of public interest, but they are also
threatened by new criminal sanctions, what we did not include in our last post
because we wrote about this separately earlier (here and here).  The Enabling Act
inserted two new crimes into the Criminal Code, which will not disappear when the
emergency is over. Anyone who „claims or spreads a distorted truth in relation to the
emergency in a way that is suitable for alarming or agitating a large group of people”
can be punished for a term of up to five years in prison.   While so far no journalists
have apparently been the target of this law, sources for journalists are.   Virtually
no one in the hospitals will speak on the record to journalists.  We’ve already seen
how nervous company directors are in speaking for the record about the actions of
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the military in their companies.    Lt. Col. Róbert Kiss, speaking for the government’s
Emergency Task Force, announced on Monday 27 April that 74 people had been
charged already under this law.  
Another permanent crime inserted into the criminal code by the emergency law
punishes anyone who obstructs the operation of measures that the government
takes to fight the pandemic with up to five years in prison, eight if someone dies as a
result.  Monday’s briefing by Lt. Col. Kiss indicated on Monday that 281 people had
been charged with crimes related to the pandemic.   
Between these laws, a clearly unconstitutional, disproportionate threat to freedom
of expression exists.  Not only are those who, in the view of the government, are
„distorting” the truth in Hungary punished, but so is anyone who, in the government’s
view, interferes with the measures taken during this emergency, which affects civil
society organizations in Hungary who have strongly condemned Orbán’s emergency
decrees.   These criminal measures create a repressive atmosphere in which the
possibility of dissent has been curtailed.  
The Emergency is Unconstitutional  
We might note in closing that Dr. Karsai failed to make three obvious points which
provide the backdrop to any proper analysis of the Hungarian Enabling Act and
the decrees that Orbán is issuing every day. The first is that, due to the special
construction of the Hungarian legal system, every measure that has been taken by
the government to protect the country against the coronavirus so far could have
been taken without declaring a state of emergency. The government could have
instead used the existing powers in Act CXXVIII of 2011 on Emergency Management
and Act CLIV of 1997 on Health.  Thus, while other countries may have had to
introduce emergency measures to create a blanket curfew or to order stores to
close, Hungary already had those powers built into its ordinary law, precisely to
be used in a pandemic.  (Actually, the general curfew was already ordered in
Hungary in a perfectly legal manner before Enabling Act was passed.)  Hungary
therefore needed no additional emergency powers to cope with the virus.  Any state
of emergency that grants blanket powers with few limitations should be treated with
suspicion under any circumstances, even more so when there is not even a pretense
that it is necessary at all.   
The second obvious point is that this whole unnecessary Hungarian emergency
framework is unconstitutional, violating Orbán’s own ‘illiberal constitution.’  Under the
current Fundamental Law, drafted and passed with only the support of the governing
party in 2011, states of emergency are highly elaborated, and they require oversight
of the government’s use of emergency powers.  But Parliament crippled its own
oversight capabilities in the Enabling Law, thus violating the constitution. 
Third, the Orbán government already has a history of misusing emergency law.  
Back in 2015, at the height of the migration crisis, Orbán insisted on being given new
emergency powers.   Parliament passed a law that gave Orbán the power to declare
a ‘state of migration emergency’ which allowed him to hunt down and detain asylum
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seekers, punish those who assisted them and to use draconian new standards for
rejecting asylum claims.    The 2015 emergency law included sunset conditions that
should have ended the emergency when the flow of refugees stopped.   But here
we are, nearly five years later with hardly a new refugee in sight, and Orbán has
renewed these emergency powers continuously through to the present day.   We
fear this bodes ill for the future of the pandemic emergency law which did not specify
sunset conditions at all.  
While Dr. Karsai identified some technical points in our earlier posts that needed
fine-tuning, and we are grateful for his careful reading of our work, these corrections
do not affect our conclusions.   Indeed, addressing Dr. Karsai’s criticisms allowed us
to find even more alarming elements both in the way that the emergency in Hungary
is legally constructed and in the way that Orbán’s decree powers are being used.  
Orbán is using his emergency powers to do almost everything except fight the virus. 
  While we appreciate Dr. Karsai’s intervention, his analysis does not lead us to be
any less concerned about the fate of the rule of law and democracy in Hungary.
We believe that Donald Tusk, former Polish Prime Minister and now President of
the European People’s Party (EPP), the party group at European level to which the
Hungarian governing party, Fidesz at least temporarily belongs, was right when he
claimed that Adolf Hitler’s jurist and prominent Nazi legal scholar Carl Schmitt would
be proud of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Carl Schmitt famously defended
Hitler’s emergency measures by saying: The Führer protects the law (Der Führer
schützt das Recht).  And that’s the situation we have in Hungary.  Viktor Orbán is the
sole judge of his own law.   
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